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Empirical studies have shown that individuals’ behaviors are largely influenced by social conformity, includ-
ing punishment. However, a coevolutionary theoretical framework that takes into account effects of conformity
on individuals’ punishment behaviors has not been put forward yet. Herein we propose a coevolutionary game
model to extend the theory of cooperation with conformity in spatial public goods game by considering pool
punishment, as well as two converse feedback modes of conformity that strongly affect cooperators’ punishment
behaviors. We focus on how different parameters and spatial structures govern evolutionary dynamics on three
different kinds of networks by employing mean-field analysis based on replicator dynamics and Monte Carlo
simulations. On regular lattices, defectors are overall extincted since cooperators, especially selfish coopera-
tors, have great evolutionary advantages due to strong network reciprocity, and at the same time the number of
altruistic cooperators decays. Conversely, abundant shortcuts in regular random networks lead to the prevalence
of altruistic cooperators, but cooperators suffer from free-riding behaviors of defectors. Of particular interest,
we find that small-world topology can simultaneously help cooperators successfully outperform defectors by
means of strong network reciprocity, and enable rich contacting opportunities with defectors to facilitate the
expansion of altruistic cooperators. Therefore, we clarify that small world is the optimal topology subject to the
dominance of altruistic cooperators.
I. INTRODUCTION
The first-order social dilemma in evolutionary game the-
ory is that the well-being of the population depends only on
the level of cooperation while defection is the best choice for
individuals. Kin selection [1], reputation [2], reciprocity [3]
and group selection [4] are well-known mechanisms to pro-
mote cooperation. Besides, punishment is widely accepted
as an useful tool to repel defection and to facilitate coopera-
tion [5–8]. At the same time, the second-order social dilemma
resulting from the fact that punishers have to bear extra sub-
stantial punishment cost remains a trouble, because this can
weaken punishers’ persistent monitoring ability and sanctions
on wrong-doers [9–11]. Accordingly, some researchers tried
to seek more efficient strategies or mechanisms to address the
above issue [12–16].
Recently some experiments suggest that humans prefer
pool punishment over peer punishment for maintaining the
commons [17]. Also, pool punishment is widely exploited
in reality to mitigate the free riders’ destructive potential. The
cost of pool punishment is shared by everyone, which thus re-
duces both financial burdens and risk of being revenged [18].
Some third organizations, such as modern courts and police
systems, could timely identify and punish defectors and thus
can be considered as implement institutions of the pool pun-
ishment. Therefore, the problems about antisocial punish-
ment [8] and retaliation [18] could be to some extent solved.
Taken together, that is why pool punishment is an important
symbol of modern civilized society, and attracts much atten-
tions recently. However, maintaining costly pool punishment
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may still result in the second-order dilemma and thus erode
cooperators. More realistic and powerful mechanisms are still
needed.
On the other hand, substantial empirical studies proceeded
by economists, psychologists and sociologists have shown
that people tend to conform to other group members or the
majority of their community. In individual psychology prob-
lems [19, 20], voting situations [21, 22], evolutionary game
theory [23, 24] and so on, such phenomenon is named as ma-
jority rule, peer influence or social impact. Specifically, Hilbe
et al. uncovered a close relationship between pool punish-
ment and majority vote in terms of the prevalence of cooper-
ation [25]. Cui and Wu [23] analyzed a variant of the pris-
oner’s dilemma game (PDG) where an individual’s strategies
are affected by others’ and showed the positive role of confor-
mity in the emergence of large-scale cooperation. Moreover,
some laboratory experiments on social dilemmas have pointed
out that, under certain conditions, social impact involves not
only human behaviors but also the punishment on these be-
haviors [26]. We also note that Ref. [27] indicates two dif-
ferent response modes of individuals to the influence exerted
by conformity: positive feedback (the majority rule) and neg-
ative feedback (the minority rule). Therefore, understanding
how punishment driven by different response modes of con-
formity sustains public goods in evolution systems of plentiful
individuals is imperative. The model considering both pool
punishment and conformity on punishment behaviors of indi-
viduals may be a little complex, but indispensable and more
realistic. However, to the best of our knowledge, little atten-
tions has been paid to this subject.
In this paper, we focus on the public good game (PGG)
which provides a good theoretical framework to investigate
the evolution of cooperation in presence of both pool punish-
ment and conformity. The reason to adopt PGG is twofold.
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2Firstly, PGG involves a goup of players, which is suitable to
test the effects of pool punishment. Secondly, PGG is widely
accepted as the closest model to mimic money-seeking orga-
nizations such as banks, profit funds or listed companies: at-
tracting capital and sharing investment gains together.
This paper focuses on how punishment behaviors driven
by peer influence govern the evolution of cooperation on dif-
ferent networks. In particular, we classify cooperators into
two groups: altruistic cooperators (ACs) and selfish cooper-
ators (SCs) according to two different feedback modes under
peer influences. Our aim is to identify the optimal conditions
including both parameter values and topological features for
overall cooperators and the prevalence of altruistic coopera-
tors. In detail, we find that regular lattice (RL) is a perfect
breeding ground for selfish cooperators, where altruistic co-
operators and selfish cooperators exclude each other. Instead,
on a regular random network (RRN) the two types of coop-
erators behave as a mutual assistance alliance to resist de-
fectors which are in the dominated position in most param-
eter regions. Finally, the combination of clustering and short-
cuts, say the small-world network, is demonstrated to be the
optimal topology to sustain altruistic cooperation and public
goods under suitable parameter conditions. In addition, both
simulations and analysis strongly support our proposed phys-
ical interpretation of the emergence of abundant altruistic co-
operative behaviors on the small-world networks.
This paper is organized as follows. We firstly give a de-
tailed description of our model on Sec. II. In Sec. III, in turn,
we fully explore the model on regular lattices (RLs) in III A,
random regular networks (RRNs) in III B and small-world net-
works based on 2D RLs in III C; respectively. Both agent-
based Monte Carlo simulation (MCS) and theoretical analysis
based on mean-filed theory are employed, which are in good
accordance with each other. Finally, we conclude this paper
in Sec. IV.
II. MODEL
On the network of size N , an over-lapping game group
contains all the nearest neighbors of the focal individual be-
sides itself, where each group member simultaneously plays
the public goods game (PGG). At the same time, each indi-
vidual i participates in ki games initiated by her neighbors,
in addition to holding a public goods game (PGG) with size
Gi = ki + 1 (together with all his neighbors); where ki is the
number of focal individual’s connections with others (i. e.,
the degree). Therefore, each individual i simultaneously plays
ki + 1 PGGs by holding the same strategy. In accordance to
the definition of PGG, each cooperator makes a contribution
of 1 to the public good, while defectors (Ds) contribute noth-
ing. Subsequently, the sum of all the contributions in a group
is multiplied by the synergy factor r > 1, which takes into ac-
count synergistic effects of cooperation. The resulting amount
is then equally shared among the members of the group. In de-
tail, there will be two different cases for i if i is a cooperator:
(1) If i carries out punishment at a probability p in an interac-
tion, its payoff would be ΠP = rnC/Gi − 1− nDα/nP ; (2)
otherwise the payoff of i is ΠC = rnC/Gi−1. nP (nC) is the
number of punishers (cooperators) in the group. α represents
the punishment fine that each defector incurs in presence of
punishers. In the case that i is a defector, ΠD = rnC/Gi if
nP = 0, or else ΠD = rnC/Gi − α.
This paper mainly investigates interactions between evolu-
tion of cooperation and spatial structures of networks or pa-
rameter conditions. In detail, there are two types of coop-
erators: altruistic cooperators (ACs) and selfish cooperators
(SCs) which would carry out a punishment on defectors in the
same group at a different probability function p. p is the feed-
back function of the number of cooperators (defectors) nC
(nD) in one group, showing two opposite forms according to
conformity preferences of the cooperators:{
pa = A
nD
G AC
ps = A
nC
G SC
(1)
The two response modes (i.e., conformity preference) quanti-
tatively assumed here have been mentioned and discussed by
Ref. [27], showing its rationality. It can be found that pa =
A−ps, and the size of the game group is n = k+1 = nC+nD.
Parameter A ∈ [0, 1] quantifies the sensitivity of feedback,
larger A indicates larger differences between AC and SC, or
more sensitive response of ACs (SCs) to the number of de-
fectors (cooperators) in the group. Relating to the reality, this
feedback mechanism defined by Eq. 1 reveals that ACs incline
to step forward to punish rather than stand aside, regardless
of the considerable cost of punishment caused by increasing
number of defectors. In contrast, SCs just take actions when
there are more cooperators (thus less defectors) to sharing the
punishment cost, in purpose of reserving their payoffs firstly.
This is the reason that herein the two types of cooperators are
respectively named as altruistic cooperators and selfish coop-
erators. Actually, ACs and SCs construct a new kind of so-
cial dilemma other than the traditional dilemma consisting of
cooperators and defectors. As ’prudent’ guys, SCs could be
considered as second-order free riders because they preserve
higher payoffs than those ACs that abhor evil as a deadly foe
by doing less to fight against wrong-doers. For simplicity of
model, it must be stressed that in our model this feedback
mechanism is only stated on punishment behaviors of coop-
erators, which means that no other mechanisms or incentives
like what mentioned in Refs. [15, 23] are introduced to drive
defectors to punish others, or change strategies of individuals.
Fig. 1 presents three different networks for detailed nu-
merical treatment in this study, as well as a brief description
about these networks. Especially, we develop a new algo-
rithm which is derived from the original small-world mod-
els [28, 29] to generate small-world networks on an original
2D RL for sake of theoretical analysis. According to the al-
gorithm, we generate the networks by starting with a regular
2-dimensional (d = 2) lattice of size N = Ld to guarantee
dense connections. Then each of the connections in the reg-
ular lattice is in turn, independently and randomly exchanged
one of its ends with that of another randomly-selected connec-
tion with probability p to produce patterns of shortcuts.
In numerical treatment, MCS is employed to update the
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FIG. 1. Illustrations of the three networks to be employed for nu-
merical treatment. In detail, (a) Regular lattice networks (RLs) i.e.,
Hexagonal lattice; (b) Regular random networks (RRNs) in which
connections are randomly distributed among nodes; (c) small-world
networks generated by our developed algorithm, which contains both
local connections (dark blue edges) and patterns of shortcuts (red
edges). In the three networks, the degree of any particular node re-
mains constant i.e., k = 6. Also, both self-connections and multiple
connections are avoided.
strategies and conformity preferences of players. And ran-
dom sequential updates are adopted to control the evolution
of the population. Initially each player fixed on the networks
is randomly and independently designated as cooperators or
defectors, and altruistic kind or selfish kind. Each simula-
tion procedure contains N times of the following steps such
that every one owns one and only one chance to change its
strategy and conformity preference on average: (1) A ran-
domly selected player i accumulates its payoff Πi by playing
Gi PGGs with its k nearest neighbors as one member of the
Gi groups. The randomly-chosen nearest neighbors j also ob-
tains its payoff Πj in the same way. (2) Then i simulates both
the strategy and conformity preference of j with probability
Wj←−i = 1/[1 + exp((Πi − Πj)/κ)]. The fermi study func-
tion implies players owning higher payoffs are advantaged,
while adoption of those of a player performing worse is still
possible. κ curves the noise of the uncertainty in the adop-
tion. Without loss of generality we set κ = 0.1 throughout
this paper. The simulations are performed until the system
has reached steady state, i. e., the numbers of ACs, SCs and
Ds keep stable.
The final densities of all four strategies (ρs) are obtained
after at least 1.0× 104 Monte Carlo steps (MCS) to guarantee
equilibrium existence, and averaged over 20−50 independent
realizations to insure a low variability. The size of RRNs is
N = 40000, and the size of RLs or the small-world networks
based on 2D RLs is N = 200 × 200. Throughout this paper,
degree of each node in employed networks is k = 6.
III. RESULTS
A. The results on regular lattice networks
In this subsection, we focus on how punishment fine, feed-
back sensitivity, synergy factor of PGG govern the evolution
of cooperation on RLs. We simulate the evolutionary dynam-
ics ruled by our game model as defined in Sec. II, as well as a
theoretical analysis listed detailedly in Appendix. A.
 (a) C
0
2
4
6
0
0.5
1
AC 0
0.2
0.4
0.6 SC
0
0.5
1
 (b) C
0
2
4
6
0
0.5
1
AC 0
0.2
0.4
0.6 SC
0
0.5
1
 (c) C
0 0.5 1.0
A
0
2
4
6
0.6
0.8
1
AC
0 0.5 1.0
A
0
0.2
0.4
0.6 SC
0 0.5 1.0
A
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
FIG. 2. Fractions of cooperators ρC , altruistic cooperators ρAC and
selfish cooperators ρSC , plotted versus A and α on Hexagonal lat-
tice. The values of the synergy factor are r = 3.5 (a), r = 4.0 (b),
and r = 4.5 (c); respectively. The solid lines represent the analytical
predicted critical boundaries, while the dashdotted lines the semi-
analytical prediction. And the estimated value of f1 in semi analysis
is 0.75 for r = 3.5. To differentiate, we let f1 (f2) denote density of
ACs (SCs) in theoretical or semi analysis, and see Appendix. A for
more information of f1 (f2)).
Fig. 2 presents the dependence of fractions of cooperators
ρC , altruistic cooperators ρAC and selfish cooperators ρSC on
A and α on Hexagonal lattice for different r. It is obvious that
cooperators are able to persist and even prevail in most pa-
rameter region, which confirms positive roles of lattices with
dense connections in promoting cooperators [30] especially
selfish cooperators. On RLs, cooperators in spite of ACs and
SCs could easily get together to form clusters to resist defec-
tors, so that there are less defectors around cooperators or in
a group containing cooperators. This is called network reci-
procity [4, 30, 31]. A direct illustration of the evolution is
shown in Fig. 3. Large clusters of cooperators are formed in
RLs. SCs driven by proportions of cooperators in the group
are thus more likely to carry out punishment to expand and
capture defective domains. Longer boundaries between SCs
and Ds are found in Fig. 3(a)(c). Moreover, dense distribu-
tions of local cooperators resulting from high local clustering
could share more punishment cost together [30]. Especially,
for large value of A, SCs are more dominant by taking ad-
vantage of the fight of altruistic cooperators against defectors.
This is also further verified by illustrations in Fig. 3(c), in
which SCs capture most inner regions of cooperator clusters
as ACs is resisting Ds at boundaries of these clusters. Con-
sequently, SCs prevail over ACs in the defector-existed period
(i.e., early stage of evolution). After the population being fully
occupied by cooperators, the evolutionary dynamics could be
essentially mapped into an opinion tuning process, because
every cooperator owning equal payoffs. Consequently, who-
ever is superior in numbers is dominator. Finally, SCs are at a
dominated position.
At the same time, we note that there always exists a small
optimal parameter region (near A = 0.235, and punishment
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FIG. 3. Typical snapshots of the simulation grid for three different
values of A: A = 0.13 (a), A = 0.235 (b) and A = 0.42 (c) at
different time, where r = 3.5 and α = 6.0. Herein, 100× 100 win-
dows of computer simulations are shown. Defectors are represented
by blue, altruistic cooperators by green and selfish cooperators by
red. The last two snapshots of each subfigures show a majority-like
evolution phenomena: whoever is superior in numbers after defeat-
ing the defectors is dominator. Additionally, subfigure (b) depicts an
optimal situation for ACs.
should be strong enough i. e. α > 4.0) where ACs instead
thrive. Furthermore, larger optimal parameter regions are ob-
served for higher r, which indicates that evolutionary advan-
tages of ACs could be more easily enhanced by higher synergy
factor. A clear micro-level picture could explain this. Unre-
sponsive ACs brought about by small A would exert too few
punishment on Ds within the group, so as to leave the expand
opportunities to SCs (Fig. 3(a)). Conversely, large A means
that ACs would be too sensitive to punish too many defectors
of different groups, which reduces payoffs of themselves too
much, leading to being devoured by SCs (Fig. 3(c)). In any
case, strong punishment (high α) is a premise to guarantee
possible prevalence of ACs. Moreover, it can be observed in
Fig. 2 that the two types of cooperators exclude each other (the
parameter regions of their prevalence are not overlapped), but
not totally. Close coexistence of ACs and SCs seems more or
less hard to achieve, attributing to the majority-like evolution
rule [32] mentioned above. Fig. 11 in Appendix. B also illus-
trates dynamical behaviors of the system by plotting evolution
fractions of different kinds of cooperators. Diverse relaxation
time for different punishment fine α and A could be firstly
observed. Especially, the fractions of selfish cooperators have
the rule of first decreased then rose, which reveals that SCs
are better than ACs in getting together to from clusters to face
defectors.
Besides, there exist two relatively constant critical values
of feedback sensitivity and punishment fine: Ac and αc be-
yond which the dominance of cooperators in the population
is established. In other words, strong effectiveness of punish-
ment [33] and enough sensitive conformity feedback of indi-
viduals are simultaneously needed to sustain the public goods.
Herein mean-filed theory based on well-mixed assump-
tion can be used to analyze the stability of the evolution of
the system and to further predict the boundary between full-
cooperation phase and full-defection phase. Whatever, Fig. 2
shows that our theoretical analysis is able to curve the core
of the evolution through giving existence condition of interior
equilibria point. Please see Appendix. A for more information
about theoretical analysis.
Overall, the above results suggest that the punishment
driven by conformity is surprisingly a useful tool to suppress
defection strategy in a population with dense local connec-
tions. This has not been stressed or even mentioned by pre-
vious researches involving punishment mechanism in evolu-
tionary game theory. However, it can be concluded that the
first order social dilemma is restrained while the second order
dilemma still exists in RLs. Since SCs dominate the popu-
lation as the second-order free riders under most parameter
conditions. Therefore we shift our focus from RLs to RRNs
in the following subsection.
B. The results on regular random networks
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FIG. 4. Fractions of cooperators ρC , altruistic cooperators ρAC and
selfish cooperators ρSC , plotted versus A and α on the RRNs. The
values of synergy factor r are: (a) r = 3.5, (b) r = 4.0 and (c) r =
4.5, respectively. The dashdotted lines represent the semi-analytical
predictions; where the estimated value of f1 is: (a) 0.629, (b) 0.618
and (c) 0.621, respectively.
In comparison with the results of RLs, the results presented
in Fig. 4 give a totally different picture. Cs are suppressed to
a certain extent while Ds hold evolution advantages in most
parameter regions. Besides, as expected, higher returns of
contribution (large r) extend the parameter regions of full-
cooperation phase, but not too much. Less overlaps between
PGG groups caused by sparse local clustering of RRNs is a
crucial negative factor to cooperation. Because of this factor,
network reciprocity between Cs is weak so that they fail to
sustain competitive payoffs in comparison to Ds through fre-
quently reciprocating with each other. Even worse, there are
less punishers to share the cost of pool punishment together.
This leads to a disappointing result that cooperators could not
stop invasion of Ds in most parameter cases on RRNs.
However, it is surprising that ACs are able to surpass both
Ds and SCs if two conditions strong punishment (large value
of α) and appropriate feedback sensitivity (A ≈ 0.2) are si-
multaneously satisfied. Fig. 5 provides some hints on how
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FIG. 5. Evolution of the fractions of three different strategy pairs on
RRNs. The feedback sensitivity of the individuals is A = 0.09 (a)
A = 0.20 (b) and A = 0.55 (c), respectively. The other parameters
are taken as r = 4.5 and α = 6.0.
to give the interpretations of this phenomenon by plotting
the evolution of the fractions of three different strategy pairs.
From the results for RLs we know that SCs are more de-
pendent on local supports from other cooperators, i.e., they
need more surrounding cooperative players to support them
and meanwhile to drive them to sanction the surrounding Ds.
Therefore their expanding ability is limited on RRNS with
sparse local connections. While things become complicated
for ACs under such circumstance. Overall, more shortcuts
generated from random reconnections enable ACs to get in
ouch with large number of Ds to stimulate more punishment
on Ds with more opportunity. In case of small A, more strat-
egy pairs of AC −D (see Fig. 5(a)) in the beginning of evo-
lution mean that insensitive or even unresponsive ACs would
have high payoffs to confront with Ds; but they are finally
prohibited or even absorbed by Ds like SCs due to lack of
punishment to suppress these Ds. In contrast, the cost of
punishment that excessively sensitive ACs curved by large A
should share may be too high to greatly reduce their payoffs,
because too many Ds are sanctioned. Less strategy pairs of
AC − D are thus observed in Fig. 5(c). This explains why
response sensitivity of ACs should be median, as shown in
Fig. 5(b), under the parameter condition they could not only
defeat Ds through enough and strong punishment (large α)
but also maintain higher payoffs than Ds at the borders of C
clusters to finally prevent themselves from Ds’ invasion, or
even absorb them into C clusters. The evolutionary dynamics
corresponding to Fig. 5 are also supplemented in Fig. 12 of
Appendix. B, by giving evolution of different types of coop-
erators. Unlike what we have observed in Fig. 11, the systems
on RRNs can quickly reach a stable state due to lack of coop-
erators’ clustering process, regardless of punishment fine and
feedback sensitivity of the individuals.
Differing the mutually exclusion between ACs and SCs on
RLs, Fig. 4 shows that the parameter regions of positive frac-
tions of ACs and SCs are highly overlapped; implying a strong
reciprocity relationship like mutualistic symbiosis. It suggests
that SCs, considered as the second-order free riders, should
be only under the protection of ACs to survive. After all,
SCs could sustained considerable payoffs through cooperat-
ing with ACs.
Moreover, notice that both Fig. 4 and Fig 5 give two stable
equilibrias: full cooperation and full defection. This means
that majority-like rule still works after that all Ds have died
out, which is independent of the network structures. Fur-
thermore, the simulated phase regions are more or less in
accordance with the predictions given by the semi-analysis
through estimating value of f1. It is strange, but easily un-
derstood. Large amount of shortcuts give rise to large contact
areas between Cs and Ds. Hence large relatively closed clus-
ters containing only Cs are not allowed to exist universally
on RRNs [30]. The numbers of strategy pairs of AC − D
and SC − D always close to each other at defector-existed
stage of evolution (see Fig. 4), neither side have a big advan-
tage in number. As a consequence, especially near the critical
boundaries, strategy abundance behaves sharper fluctuations
between full-C state and full-D state. We thus only have to
estimate a constant fraction of ACs to enable a relatively pre-
cise analytical prediction (for more details see Appendix. A).
Fortunately, coincidence between simulated boundaries and
dashdotted lines confirms the feasibility of our semi-analytical
method.
On the whole, the second-order social dilemma are over-
come to some extent on RRNs, but the problem of the first-
order social dilemma becomes much more serious owing to
absence of dense local connections. It seems hard to find
an optimal topology on which not only the traditional social
dilemma (the first-order social dilemma) but also the second-
order social dilemma could be alleviated. Nevertheless, our
detailed investigations on RLs and RRNs provide a crucial
hint: dense local clustering is very favorable to prevalence
of SCs while shortcuts largely facilitate the dominated roles
of ACs in sanctioning or suppressing Ds. Hence the optimal
topology must be a combination of dense local connections
and considerable shortcuts. Naturally, small-world network is
the first choice. Next we will proceed our study on this net-
work, through both agent-based simulations and qualitative
theoretical analysis.
C. The results on small-world networks based on 2D RLs
In what follows, we mainly focus on how topology of
small-world networks especially the number of shortcuts
quantified by randomness p affects the evolution of different
strategies, under different parameter conditions.
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FIG. 6. Fractions of cooperators ρC , altruistic cooperators ρAC and
selfish cooperators ρSC , plotted versus randomness p for the small-
world networks based on 2D RLs. The results for different values of
α are plotted. The other parameter are taken as r = 4.0 and A =
0.235. The dark marker for each α corresponds to the position of
optimal randomness (p∗) where the population of ACs is maximum.
We could also have a deep understand of the relationship between
ACs and SCs by comparing the population size of ACs with that of
SCs at this parameter point.
6We firstly plot the fractions of three populations: Cs, ACs
and SCs in Fig. 6 as function of network randomness p.
Monotonous decay of cooperator populations with p can be
observed in the first panel of Fig. 6. The small-world networks
based on 2D RLs approximates RLs as p approaching to zero,
and adversely RRNs if p is large enough. Therefore, the ar-
guments put forward in Subsec. III A and Subsec. III B allow
us to easily understand the changes of cooperator population
with the randomness of networks. As we pointed out, dense
local clustering resulting from small p facilitates cooperators’
evolution success, until the critical point of randomness that
network reciprocity fails to sustain dominance of Cs. Fur-
thermore, full-C phase could be easily achieved in regions of
strong network reciprocity which could be enlarged by pun-
ishment fine α.
Importantly and interestingly, we find in the middle panel
of Fig. 6 that in most cases with p there exist optimal interme-
diate parameter regions centering on the peaks of ACs’ frac-
tions at p∗; where not only Cs rise to full dominance (cap-
ture all the population), but also ACs are evolutionary suc-
cessful by successfully eliminating and outperforming others
to form a stable coexistence with SCs as a result. This means
that the small-world networks is the optimal topology we try
to seek to alleviate both the first-order and the second-order
social dilemma. More precisely, as shown in Fig. 6, larger
punishment fines enable wider optimal regions; implying that
only strong effectiveness of punishment guarantees the perfect
performance of the small-world networks based on 2D RLs
with more opportunity. Additionally, the third panel of Fig. 6
presents a narrow optimal region of SCs when effectiveness of
punishment is not strong enough, as p is larger but still inter-
mediate. Also, similar phenomena could be observed for other
values of synergy factor such as r = 3.5 and r = 4.5 (please
see Fig. 14 listed in Appendix. B). Microscopic mechanism
behind these rich reported evolutionary outcomes is required
to be given to make understanding of the evolutionary picture
clear.
Subsec. III A and Subsec. III B have listed detailed argu-
ments to explain the evolution outcomes under two situations:
p = 0 and p = 1. Now we center our attention on the mecha-
nisms for behaviors of system at parameter region 0 < p < 1.
Essentially, effects of spatial topology of the small-world net-
works on changes in number of ACs and SCs can be explained
by the comparison between networks reciprocity stemming
from dense local clustering and odds of contacting with Ds
afforded by shortcuts. Both Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 provide a more
direct insight into the evolution behaviors of different strate-
gies and conformity preferences. If p is small, strong network
reciprocity confer SCs and ACs enough payoffs to hold strat-
egy (top panel of Fig. 7 show that both ACs and SCs own
higher payoffs than their connected defectors do), while the
number of contacted Ds of ACLs are less than they ought to be
able to sanction. This implies that ACLs are not fully utilized
in suppressing Ds. Positive peak of ∆nACL(t) can thus not
be observed in Fig. 7 for p = 0.01. On the other hand, more
local cooperators including both ACNLs and SCNLs begin to
absorb defectors on the other sides of the local borders (local
borders differ from those shortcuts connecting different strate-
FIG. 7. Evolution of different statistics for three different values of
randomness of the small-world networks base on 2D RLs. Different
statistics are plotted to enable a deep interpretation of the results pre-
sented in Fig. 6. Top panels: the mean payoff gaps between different
types of cooperators and their connected defectors. Middle panels:
changing rate of edges D − S to quantify how many edges change
from D − S to S − S (S = ACNL, ACL, SCNL and SCL) at
each time step, which are normalized by the total number of edges in
the networks. Bottom panels: evolution frequencies of four different
types of cooperators. The other parameters are taken as r = 4.0,
A = 0.235 and α = 4.5.
gies, mainly consist of local Cs i. e., ACNLs and SCNLs) (see
Fig. 8(a) and red hollow circles illustrated in middle panels
of Fig. 7) to expand permanently. Correspondingly, we ob-
serve obvious positive peaks of ∆nACNL(t) and ∆nSCNL(t)
in Fig. 7 (the red hollow circles). Consequently, ACNLs form
a stable coexistence with SCNLs (see bottom panels of Fig. 7);
or even give ways to SCNLs because SCNLs are more active
than ACNLs in carrying out punishment. After the popula-
tion reach the sate of full cooperation, it is possible that the
majority-like evolution rule would further solidify advantages
of SCs; which is supported by the illustration in last subfigure
of Fig. 8(a).
With increasing p, more connections of Cs are allocated to
reach the D territories outside C clusters as shortcuts, such that
ACLs strike a balance i. e., strong network reciprocity and
sanctions against Ds match each other. ACLs’ benefits from
many other cooperative group members are enough to bear
costs of punishment (A large positive peak of ∆ACL−D(t)
can still be found in Fig. 7 for p = 0.09 which is the opti-
mal randomness of the networks for α = 4.0). At the same
time, they sustain competitive payoffs in comparison to DLs
after punishment. By contrast, because of more shortcuts,
SCs are also more likely to touch more Ds, and then begin to
shift their main attentions from punishment to reserving pay-
offs. Moreover, ACNLs are not restricted and instead active
in expanding, which is affirmed by the sharp positive peak of
∆nACNL(t) showed in the first subfigure in middle panels of
Fig. 7. As a result, ACLs absorb the Ds at the other end of
shortcuts (these newly transformed Cs actually play a role of
’seed’) at a faster speed than SCs (Fig. 7 also present large
positive peaks of ∆ACL−D(t) and ∆nACL(t) for p = 0.09),
accompanying a subsequent growth of ACNLs surrounding
these ’seeds’ (see Fig. 8(b)). Then these small clusters cen-
7(a) t=2 t=60 t=155 t=10000
(b) t=6 t=30 t=60 t=100
(c) t=10 t=50 t=100 t=200
DNL
DL
ACNL
ACL
SCNL
SCL
FIG. 8. Typical snapshots of the simulation grid for three different values of p: p = 0.01 (a), p = 0.09 (b) and p = 0.13 (c) at different
time. Here, 100× 100 windows of computer simulations are shown. For sake of interpretation of the evolution dynamics on the small-world
networks, we further clarify the cooperators with the same conformity preference into two classes. In detail, defectors (altruistic cooperators,
selfish cooperators) at the end of shortcuts are denoted as DL (ACL, SCL), while local defectors (altruistic cooperators, selfish cooperators)
which are locally connected are denoted as DNL (ACNL, SCNL). This enables a more intuitive understanding of roles of shortcuts which
containing long-range connections in the evolutionary dynamics. Moreover, the colors for corresponding strategies or types are labeled in
above figure. The other parameters are taken as A = 0.235, α = 4.5 and r = 4.0.
tering on the ’seeds’ further connect each other to capture the
majority of the population. At last, majority-like evolution
rule enable ACs to be final winners.
As p getting larger, owing to appearance of more short-
cuts in the network, the number of ACs starts dropping (see
bottom panels of Fig. 7) fast because supports from network
reciprocity is lacking, both because ACs exert sanctions too
frequently (ACs have more chances to contact more DLs to
become ACLs, even worse these Ds can stimulate more in-
terests of ACLs in sanctioning) and even more so because
ACLs’s payoffs are greatly reduced to be subverted by DLs
when punishment effectiveness is not very strong (we could
find in top panels of Fig. 7 that ACLs own uncompetitive pay-
offs for p = 0.13). Still, dense local connections are more
or less kept, which means that SCs rather than ACNLs could
possibly sustain high payoffs with the help of network reci-
procity (see Fig. 6). Especially, because of the free-riding
nature, SCs become the dominator of the whole population
again; showing peaks of fractions. As expected, there exists
a critical number of shortcuts, above which the dynamics on
small-world networks based on 2D RLs is naturally close to
what we have observed on RRNs. Weak network reciprocity
lead to extinction of Cs, in spite of ACs or SCs (Fig. 8(c));
unless the imposed fine α is sufficiently high. This further
affirms our interpretations of RRNs playing negative roles in
supporting Cs under most parameter conditions. Besides, as
a comparison of Fig. 7, Fig. 13 in Appendix. B presents a
shorter relaxation time of the system for weak punishment of
PGG, attributing to longer term of clustering behaviors of co-
operators in this case.
The proposed interpretation for existences of the optimal
parameter regions is further supported by our qualitative anal-
ysis (i. e., predicted payoff gaps) based on pair approximation
according to the example of extreme situation illustrated in
Fig. 9 (Please see Appendix. C for details of qualitative anal-
ysis). It could be found that predicted payoff gap ∆ACL−D
shows a maximum value near the observed simulated optimal
parameter regions. At the same time, it should be noted that
∆ACL−D are negative, because the most favorable condition
for the focused defector is assumed for sake of analysis: all
of its local group members are cooperators. However, most
defectors are actually in a more disadvantaged evolutionary
position, since most of their local group members are instead
defective guys, which is also supported by the snapshots il-
lustrated in Fig. 8. As a result, ACLs can own higher payoffs
than their defective neighbors after sanctions, especially in the
optimal parameter regions. After all, the qualitative analysis
successfully identify that ACLs play a key role in facilitating
prevalence of ACs in the population, by suggesting the most
likehood of ACLs’ expansion which is positively related to
∆ACL−D. That is in accordance our interpretation.
The dependence of optimal randomness and maximum
population fractions of AC on punishment fines, respectively
depicted in the subfigure of Fig. 10, allows us to compre-
hensively understand how the small-world topology governs
the performance of pool punishment in changing optimal ran-
domness and facilitating ACs. We see clearly in Fig. 10(a)
that optimal randomness of the networks increase with pun-
ishment fine in a power-law-like way. It is also true for be-
havior of maximum population fraction of AC; until α ' 4.0
8...
...
(a)
ji
FIG. 9. (a) Illustration of the extreme situation in which shortcut
(the thick green solid curve) originating from the focused altruistic
cooperator i is assumed to definitely reach the defector j. The red
solid curves represent other shortcuts of the networks. Besides the
defective neighbors connected by shortcuts, we assume that the lo-
cal group members centering on i are all ACNLs (SCNLs) if it is an
ACL (SCL), and so does the focused defector j at the other end of
the shortcut (i. e. local group members of j are all ACNLs (SCNLs)
too). The two grey regions indicate group members of i and j, re-
spectively. The individuals of different strategies or types are colored
with the same colors as we adopt in Fig. 8. (b) The predicted payoff
gaps ∆ACL−D (∆SCL−D) between ACL (SCL) and its connected
defector through the shortcut is plotted as function of randomness
p for different values of punishment fines. The employed contact
networks are small-world networks based on 2D RLs. The other pa-
rameters are taken as r = 4.0 and A = 0.235. The analytical solid
lines of ∆ACL−D obviously prove the existence of optimal regions
of randomness, regardless of α.
above which strong punishment can do nothing in further pro-
moting ACs because the system begins to reach saturation in
ACs. This interesting and important phenomenon tells us that
stronger pool punishment is not always equivalent to higher
levels of altruistic cooperation in presence of two modes of
conformity feedback, which is more or less against people’s
common sense.
To sum up, in the parameter regions of strong network reci-
procity, punishment has a positive impact on the evolution of
cooperation. The desired outcome reveals great potentials of
the small-world networks based on 2D RLs in overcoming the
first-order and the second-order dilemmas. As we point out,
both Fig. 6, Fig. 7, Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 illustrate clearly that
3.0 4.0 5.0 6.010
-3
10 -2
10 -1
10 0
p*
(a)
=7.044
Simulated data
Fitting
3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0
10 -1
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AC*
(b)
=7.237
Simulated data
Fitting
FIG. 10. The dependence of (a) optimal randomness p∗ and (b) max-
imum population fraction of ACs ρ∗AC on punishment fine; which is
fitted to a power-law increase of the forms p∗ ∼ αγ and ρ∗AC ∼ αγ ,
respectively. The employed networks are the small-world networks
based on 2D RLs. The other parameters are taken as r = 4.0 and
A = 0.235. In (a), the dark solid line indicates the fitted rela-
tionship between p∗ and α; while in (b) the dark dashed line indi-
cates the power fit of the relationship between α and f∗AC in region
3.0 < α < 4.0. In detail, ρ∗AC is maximum population fraction
of ACs that the system could reach for each α (i e. ρAC at p∗).
In both cases, the fitted relationships are statistically significant ((a)
R2 = 0.9671 and P < 0.01; (b) R2 = 0.9926 and P < 0.01).
shortcuts introduced by randomness p play a decisive role in
reaching the correct evolutionary outcome from a random ini-
tial state.
IV. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In this paper we have proposed an evolutionary game model
considering two converse feedback modes of conformity that
exerting strong influence on punishment of cooperators, in
framework of PGG model. Next, we have proceeded de-
tailed investigations on the implications of the model on three
kinds of networks: regular lattice networks (RLs), regular ran-
dom networks (RRNs) and small-world networks based on 2D
RLs; aiming to find an optimal topology to overcome the first-
order and the second-order social dilemmas. In cases of re-
spective networks, we have shown how network spatial struc-
tures, feedback sensitivity of individuals, the effectiveness of
punishment and synergistic effects of cooperation govern the
evolution of cooperators (Cs), altruistic cooperators (ACs) and
selfish cooperators (SCs). Agent-based Monte Carlo (MC)
method employed in the simulations gives rich and interest-
ing outcomes, which are also supported and confirmed by the
theoretical analysis on basis of mean-field theory.
In more detail, in the second part of the paper we firstly
explore the evolutionary dynamics on RLs. Indeed, we find
that RLs overall promote cooperation especially selfish coop-
eration due to strong network reciprocity from abundant local
connections; which is also in accordance with the conclusions
from previous studies concerning evolutionary dynamics on
networks [4, 30, 31]. Nevertheless, altruistic cooperation is
in a particularly vulnerable situation for the general case ex-
cept that punishment fine is rather large andA is intermediate.
This implies that the second-order dilemma persists as a trou-
ble. In the analytical way employing a set of equations of the
9replicator dynamics, we could derive a mathematical expres-
sion of the critical boundary between C phase and D phase,
which turns out to depend on degree of each node in the RLs,
feedback sensitivity of individuals and synergistic effects of
cooperation. We find a nice agreement between simulation
results and analytical predictions.
In subsequent case of RRNs, things become different and
perhaps more negative. Cs are completely suppressed by Ds
in most A − α parameter region because of weak network
reciprocity from less overlaps among PGG groups, however,
strong effectiveness of punishment and mediate conformity
feedback sensitivity may together contribute to the dominance
of ACs. In other words, ACs have an advantage over other
guys in the limited cases while whole cooperator population
overall suffer from free riding of defectors. The results for
RRNs suggest that the evolutionary dynamics is more depen-
dent on the control parameters such as punishment fine, syn-
ergy factor and conformity feedback sensitivity of individu-
als; because the system is closed to well-mixed situation. Be-
sides, fractions of ACs show sharper fluctuations at the crit-
ical boundaries, we thus instead use one estimated constant
fraction of ACs in analysis. Coincidence between simulated
phase areas and predicted boundaries proves that our semi-
analytical method is useful. Taken together, although RLs and
RRNs themselves are not best choices for ACs , the results on
the two networks correctly lead us to precise characteristics of
the optimal topology we are looking for: owning both dense
local connections and mediate shortcuts.
Especially and naturally, a very interesting point in this
respect regards what happens on the small-world networks;
since this topology owns both dense local connections and
shortcuts originating from random reconnections. In such
a case, quite remarkably, simulation results show that there
indeed exists a moderate optimal parameter region in terms
of randomness of the networks, in which altruistic cooper-
ators (ACs) capture the majority of the population. This is
in agreement with the qualitative analysis assuming an ex-
treme situation that the shortcuts from an altruistic cooperator
(selfish cooperator) would point to a defector without doubt.
For more details, microscopic mechanism behind the reported
evolutionary outcomes can be explained by the comparison
between strong network reciprocity and considerable but fa-
vorable chances to contact Ds through shortcuts. A balance
between the two factors can help ACs outperform defectors,
and further prevail over SCs. The results prove that the small-
world networks based on 2D RLs can not only help cooper-
ators successfully suppress defectors by means of strong net-
work reciprocity stemming from dense local connections, but
also provide sufficient contacts between ACs and Ds to facili-
tate the expansion and prevalence of ACs in presence of strong
effectiveness of punishment. In a narrow region of the large
p, SCs can instead be in a dominated position. But apart from
this, as network reciprocity weakening with more shortcuts,
punishment fails and cooperation is evolutionary unsuccess-
ful. These results are also robust to changes of synergistic
effects of cooperation. Furthermore, we find an interesting
phenomenon, that is on the small-world networks the maxi-
mum population of ACs is actually bounded, i. e., ACs can not
capture overall population; no matter how strong pool punish-
ment is. In summary, small-world networks based on 2D RLs
turn out to be one optimal choice to sustain public goods by
alleviating both the first-order and the second-order dilemmas.
In comparison to previous researches [16, 34, 35], our study
proposes a new and more realistic theoretical framework to
curve the evolutionary dynamics capturing interplay between
conformity preference and punishment behavior. This model
as well as the analytical method can be employed by future
further investigations concerning evolutionary game dynam-
ics, as a basic theoretical tool. Our study also reveals con-
ditions that favor cooperation especially altruistic coopera-
tion: sufficiently high multiplication factor of the public goods
game, mediate conformity feedback sensitivity of individu-
als, strong effectiveness of punishment and the most important
factor: small-world-like social connections. This provides an
initial guide for governments or enterprises on how to sustain
or even facilitate social public goods, or on how to improve
return rate.
It is also worth noticing that in this study we do not consider
the situation that strategy states of group members could exert
influence on changes of individual’s strategy [23] or antisocial
punishment [36]. In the light of this fact, it is important and
interesting to extend our current theory of cooperation in spa-
tial PGG with antisocial punishment or the option that shift of
individuals’ strategies are also influenced by conformity.
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APPENDIX A
In both genetic evolutions, the evolutionary process can be
analytically described by a set of equations called the replica-
tor dynamics [37]. The evolutionary dynamics of the studied
system could thus be determined by the following replicator
equation:
df
dt
= f(1− f)(ΠX −ΠD) (2)
where f is the fraction of all the cooperators in the population.
ΠX = xΠP + (1− x)ΠC represents the average payoff of all
the cooperators. x is the expected probability that a cooperator
become a punisher in the group. ΠC , ΠP and ΠD represent
the average payoffs of cooperators, punishers and defectors,
respectively.
To theoretically investigate the evolution of cooperation, it
is assumed that in each round of the game an interaction group
is assembled by randomly selecting n individuals from the
population. Accordingly, we can obtain the expressions of
ΠC , ΠP and ΠD respectively:
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ΠP =
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
f i(1− f)n−1−i
i∑
j=0
(
i
j
)
gj(1− g)i−j [r(i+ 1)
n
− 1− α(n− 1− i)
j + 1
], (3)
ΠC =
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
f i(1− f)n−1−i
i∑
j=0
(
i
j
)
gj(1− g)i−j [r(i+ 1)
n
− 1], (4)
ΠD =
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
f i(1− f)n−1−i
i∑
j=1
(
i
j
)
gj(1− g)i−j [ri
n
− α] +
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
f i(1− f)n−1−i(1− g)i ir
n
, (5)
where g(ps(i), pa(i)) is the probability that a randomly se-
lected cooperator becomes a punisher, as the function of num-
ber of cooperators i in the group. For simplicity, it is assumed
that the relationship g = (1 − y)ps + ypa is hold; where y
(1− y) represents the weight of contribution of ACs (SCs) to
the probability g. Based on Eq. 1, the following relationship
is obtained:
g(i) = y + (1− 2y)ps(i)
= y + (1− 2y)Ai
n
(6)
Furthermore, combing Eq. 3, Eq. 4 and Eq. 5, we obtain:
h = ΠX −ΠD
=
r
n
− 1 + α(1− φ− ψ) (7)
where h is the function of parameters A, r, x and
y. φ =
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
f i(1 − f)n−1−i(1 − g)i,ψ =
x
n−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
f i(1−f)n−1−i
i∑
j=0
(
i
j
)
gj(1−g)i−j [n−1−ij+1 ].
Eq. 2 could be translated into:
df
dt
= f(1− f)h(A, r, x, y) (8)
It could be found that there are two stable boundary equilibria
f = 0 and f = 1, and one unstable interior equilibria which
is determined by h(A, r, x, y) = 0. Actually, g = g(A,α),
which means that g is fully determined by A and α, even
though the functional form is not clear. Therefore, g could
be considered as a constant, in addition to x = g. Therefore
Eq. 8 could be reduced to:
h = (−1 + r
n
) + a[1− (1− gf)n−1](1− 1− f
f
) (9)
for dfdt = 0.
Next, we focused on theoretical predictions of the bound-
aries. Fig. 2 shows that the selfish cooperators are dominated
near the boundary, so we let f = f2 (f2 represents the frac-
tions of selfish cooperators) and g(i) = ps(i) = A in . Based
on Eq. 3, Eq. 4, Eq. 5 and Eq. 7, we have:
α(A, g, f2) =
1− r/n
1− ψ(A, g, f2)− φ(A, f2) (10)
where g = Anf2n = Af2 in the point of full mean-field theory.
The stability analysis of the system implies that f2 = 1 on one
side of the boundary, so theoretical predictions could be ob-
tained for RLs by directly setting f2 = 1. However, because
of small synergy factor, it could be found that f2 < 1 near
the boundary due to existence of interior equilibria shown in
Fig 2(a). As a result, semi-theoretical analysis by adjusting
the value of f2 instead provide more accurate prediction.
In case of RRNs, Fig. 4 shows that ACs are dominated near
the boundary between full-D phase and full-C phase, so we
instead let f = f1 (f1 represents the fractions of ACs near the
boundary) and p(i) = pa(i) = A−A in . Based on Eq. 11, we
have:
α(A, g, f1) =
1− r/n
1− ψ(A, g, f1)− φ(A, f1) (11)
where g = pa(i) = A(1 − in ) in the point of full mean-field
theory. Since ACs and SCs coexist together near the boundary
(i.e., f1 6≈ 1.0), only semi-theoretical analysis could be get by
estimating the values of f1 in Eq. 11.
APPENDIX B
FIG. 11. Evolution of fractions of three different types of cooperators
for different punishment fines on RLs. The values of feedback sensi-
tivity areA = 0.03 (a)A = 0.235 (b) andA = 0.5 (c); respectively.
The other parameter is r = 4.0.
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FIG. 12. Evolution of fractions of three different types of cooperators
for different punishment fines on RRs. The values of feedback sensi-
tivity areA = 0.03 (a)A = 0.20 (b) andA = 0.55 (c); respectively.
The other parameter is r = 4.0.
FIG. 13. Evolution of fractions of four different types of cooperators
for different randomness on the small-world networks base on 2D
RLs. The values of punishment fine are α = 4.0 (a) and α = 5.0
(b); respectively. The other parameters are r = 4.0 and A = 0.235.
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FIG. 14. Fractions of three different strategies: ρC , ρAC and ρSC ,
plotted versus p for two different values synergy factor: r = 3.5 (a)
and r = 4.5 (b). The value of feedback sensitivity isA = 0.235. The
employed networks are the small-world networks based on 2D RLs.
The dark marker for each α corresponds to the position of optimal
randomness where the population of ACs is maximum.
APPENDIX C
According to the illustration in Fig. 9(a), the payoffs of the
focused altruistic cooperator and its connected defector are
Πi =
n−2∑
l=0
(
n− 2
l
)
(
p
2
)l(1− (p
2
)n−2−l)[pa(
r(n− l − 1)
n
− 1.0− α(l + 1)
(n− l − 1)pa ) + (1− pa)(
r(n− l − 1)
n
− 1.0)], (12)
Πj =
n−2∑
l=0
(
n− 2
l
)
(
p
2
)l(1− (p
2
)n−2−l)[(1− (1− pa)n−l−1)(r(n− l − 1)
n
− α) + (1− pa)n−l−1(r(n− l − 1)
n
)], (13)
where pa = A i+1n and l represent the number of shortcuts
except the one between i and j. Based on our assumption, the
number of defective group members is l for j, and l + 1 for i.
Eq. 13 naturally gives the payoff gap between i and j
∆ACL−D = Πi −Πj (14)
, which is function of p. Similarly, we could obtain the payoff
gap between SCL and its connected defector ∆SCL−D if pa
in Eq. 13 is replaced with ps = An−l−1n .
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